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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
PATRICK O'NEIL,
Petitioner-Appellant,

)
)
)

NO. 40120
BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CV 2012-235

V.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Respondent.

)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Patrick O'Neil asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho
Court of Appeals, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 759 (Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2013)
(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the district court's
order summarily dismissing his Petition for Post Conviction Relief (hereinafter, Petition),
is in conflict with previous decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals which hold
that a petitioner should be appointed counsel if he raises the possibility of a valid claim
and that inferences made in a petition and supporting affidavit must be liberally
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construed in favor of the non-moving party. See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,
792 (2004); Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998).

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2011, Mr. O'Neil was convicted of possession of stolen property and received
a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed. (R., p.1.) In 2012 he filed a
petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., p.1.)

He alleged that his trial counsel was

ineffective and that a detective withheld mitigating information. (R., p.2.)
Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. O'Neil alleged that his attorney
would not correspond with him, had induced his plea by promising a rider, had agreed
to an amount of restitution without consulting him, and persuaded him to plead guilty
because he could have received a life sentence. (R., p.3.)
Mr. O'Neil then elaborated:

He asserted that his attorney was ineffective for

entering into a restitution agreement without his knowledge or consent, for refusing his
calls and refusing to provide him discovery, for failing to file a motion to suppress, and
for failing to attach letters or certificates in support of his Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. (R., p.5.) Mr. O'Neil also filed a motion for appointment

of counsel. (R., p.12.)
The State filed an answer.
intent to dismiss.

(R., p.42.)

(R., p.36.) The district court then filed a notice of

Regarding the motion for appointment of counsel, the

district court ruled:
Mr. O'Neil did not offer any specific facts as to the basis of his motion for
the appointment of counsel. Instead, the Petitioner relied on general
contentions regarding his inability to represent himself. Thus, this Court
cannot assess the merits of his claim and therefore must deem his motion
to be frivolous on its face. Consequently, after taking every inference in
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the Petitioner's favor and considering the request for counsel, including a
consideration regarding whether this case appears to be one in which
counsel should be appointed to assist the Petitioner, this Court must deny
the Motion for Appointment of Counsel.
(R., p.46.) Regarding the merits of the petition, this district court stated that, "petitioner
did not offer any specific facts or evidence showing ineffectiveness, or even make any
specific argument that his attorney was actually deficient. Mr. O'Neil did not offer any
specific facts or make any argument as to how his was prejudiced by any deficient
conduct." (R., p.52.)
Mr. O'Neil responded to the notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.58.) Regarding the
court's assertion that he had not submitted any evidence in support of his petition,
Mr. O'Neil pointed out that he attached a police report detailing the incident at issue in
this case as Exhibit 2. (R., p.59.) He also asserted that Exhibit 3 was attached to his
petition.

(R., p.60.)

Exhibit 3 is the transcript of the sentencing hearing in which

Mr. O'Neil's attorney informed the court that the amount of restitution was in dispute and
that the issue needed to be resolved in a hearing. Mr. O'Neil then again asserted that
his attorney later stipulated to a restitution amount without his knowledge or consent.
(R., p.60.) Mr. O'Neil asserted that restitution was unwarranted because the restitution
figures were for crimes he did not commit and that the items found in his possession
were returned to the owner. (R., p.60.) He felt his attorney picked the lesser of the two
amounts when in fact neither amount was appropriate. (R., p.61.)
The court then dismissed the petition. (R., p.67.) Regarding the appointment of
counsel, the court determined that Mr. O'Neil's claims were frivolous.

(R., p.71.)

Regarding the merits of the petition, the court again concluded that Mr. O'Neil had not
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presented any evidence that counsel was ineffective or that he was prejudiced by any
deficiency and had only made bare and conclusory allegations. (R., pp.72-73.)
Mr. O'Neil appealed. (R., p.75.) He asserted that the district court erred by both
denying his motion for appointment of counsel and by summarily dismissing his petition.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.

(See Opinion.)

With regard to the appointment of

counsel, the Court held,
In the instant case, the district court followed the appropriate standards
and procedures and adequately took into account O'Neil's pro se status
when it denied O'Neil's motion for appointment of counsel. While the court
mentioned pro se litigants being held to the same standards as attorneys,
the court twice indicated that it reviewed the petition for potentially valid
claims and found none. The district court properly provided sufficient
information to O'Neil in its notice of intent to dismiss and provided O'Neil
with the opportunity to respond. O'Neil's response did not contain any new
or additional information that would raise the possibility of a valid claim.
Instead, the response simply reiterated the claims as they existed in the
petition. As a result, O'Neil's petition and response, as will be discussed
more fully below, failed to allege facts sufficient to raise the possibility of a
valid claim; thus, the denial of appointment of counsel was appropriate.
(Opinion, p.4.) With regard to the restitution issue 1, the Court held,
After reviewing the record, it is apparent that O'Neil failed to provide
evidence supporting his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for
stipulating to restitution without his consent. There is no evidence, beyond
O'Neil's bare and conclusory allegations, that his counsel ever stipulated
to restitution. O'Neil's exhibit showing that property was returned to its
owner does nothing to support a claim that his counsel stipulated to
restitution. Similarly, the proffered transcript fails to show any deficient
performance by defense counsel. Indeed, the transcript indicates that
counsel objected to restitution in accordance with O'Neil's desire.
Although the transcript also indicates that a hearing was scheduled to
further discuss restitution, O'Neil failed to include the transcript of that
hearing or any other facts regarding any restitution award in the record.
Therefore, the only evidence in the record supporting a claim that defense
counsel was deficient for stipulating to restitution without consent is

1

Mr. O'Neil had also claimed that counsel was ineffective for filing a motion to suppress.
The Court of Appeals held that the motion would not have been successful because of
the inevitable discovery doctrine. Mr. O'Neil does not pursue this claim on review.
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O'Neil's own bare allegation. O'Neil's statements are simply allegations
unsupported by factual or evidentiary support. Bare or conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a
petitioner to an evidentiary hearing.
(Opinion, pp.7-8.) Mr. O'Neil petitioned this Court for review. He asserts that the Court
of Appeals erred when it found that his claim regarding restitution was frivolous and that
he was therefore not entitled to counsel or to an evidentiary hearing.
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ISSUE
Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the district court's order summarily
dismissing Mr. O'Neil's Petition in conflict with prior decisions of this Court and the Court
of Appeals which hold that the court should appoint counsel when the petitioner raises
the possibility of a valid claim and that inferences made in a petition must be liberally
construed in favor of the non-moving party at summary dismissal?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The District Court's Order Summarily
Dismissing Mr. O'Neil's Opinion Petition Is In Conflict With Prior Decisions Of This Court
And The Court Of Appeals Which Hold That the District Court Should Appoint Counsel
When The Petitioner Raises The Possibility Of A Valid Claim And That Inferences Made
In a Petition Must Be Liberally Construed In Favor Of The Non-Moving Party At
Summary Dismissal

A.

Introduction
Mr. O'Neil asserts that Opinion, which affirmed the district court's order

summarily dismissing his petition, is in conflict with previous decisions of this Court and
the Court of Appeals which hold that a petitioner should be appointed counsel if he
raises the possibility of a valid claim and that inferences made in a petition and
supporting affidavit must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party See
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004); Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331

(Ct. App. 1998).
Further, Mr. O'Neil asserts that, if his Petition for Review is granted, this court
should remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

B.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The District Court's Order
Summarily Dismissing Mr. O'Neil's Petition Is In Conflict With Prior Decisions Of
The Court Of Appeals Which Hold That Inferences Made In a Petition Must Be
Liberally Construed In Favor Of The Non-Moving Party To A Summary Dismissal
Motion
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) provides that, "[g]ranting a petition for review from a

final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court,
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons .... " Factors to
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be considered include whether the Opinion is in conflict with a previous decision of
either the Idaho Supreme Court or the Idaho Court of Appeals. I.AR. 11 S(b )(3).
Mr. O'Neil asserts that the Opinion in his case is in conflict with previous
decisions of both this Court and the Court of Appeals. See Charboneau v. State, 140
Idaho 789, 792 (2004); Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998). As is set
forth below, in denying the motion for appointment of counsel, the district court both
considered the motion for appointment rather than the petition to determine whether
Mr. O'Neil was entitled, and held Mr. O'Neil to the same standard as an attorney. This
is contrary to Charboneau. The district court also held that the Mr. O'Neil's claims were
frivolous.

However, as is set forth below, Mr. O'Neil submits that, when the proper

standard is applied, his claim regarding restitution was not frivolous.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the claim was frivolous when addressing
whether summary dismissal was appropriate.

(Opinion, pp.7-8.)

While Mr. O'Neil

disagrees that summary dismissal was appropriate, the proper standard for determining
whether a claim is frivolous is whether the possibility of a valid claim is raised. That not
enough evidence or transcripts were initially produced does not mean that the claim is
frivolous - the purpose of appointing counsel is to permit an attorney to develop the
claims and evidence in support of those claims. Mr. O'Neil alleged that his attorney was
ineffective for stipulating to a restitution amount, and Mr. O'Neil submitted evidence that
the property was returned to the owner and alleged that counsel should have not
stipulated to restitution. While there may be some evidence lacking, this is a possible
post-conviction claim and the Court of Appeals erred in determining that it was frivolous.
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Because the Idaho Court of Appeals opinion is in conflict with prior decisions of
this Court and the Court of Appeals, Mr. O'Neil's Petition for Review should be granted.
Thus, his case should be remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.

C.

If This Court Grants Mr. O'Neil's Petition For Review, He Asserts The District
Court Erred In Failing To Appoint Counsel And By Summarily Dismissing The
Petition

1.

Motion For Appointment Of Counsel

When a petitioner in a post-conviction action requests the assistance of a
court-appointed attorney, he is entitled to that attorney if his petition is not frivolous.

Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) (hereinafter, Charboneau /). In this
context, a frivolous action is '"not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate
means would be willing to bring at his own expense."' Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 135
Idaho 676, 679 (2001) (in turn quoting I.C. § 19-852(b)(3))). Ultimately, this means that,
"[i]f the petitioner 'alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim,"' counsel should
be appointed in that case. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting

Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at 793) (emphasis added). "Therefore, the trial court should
appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such
that a person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a
further investigation into the claim." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007).
There are several problems with the district court's denial of counsel in this case.
First, in its notice of intent to dismiss, the court focused on the motion for appointment of
counsel rather than the petition itself. The court stated, "Mr. O'Neil did not offer any
specific facts as to the basis of his motion for the appointment of counsel. Instead, the
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Petitioner relied on general contentions regarding the ability to represent himself."
(R., p.46.)

Thus, the court deemed his motion for appointment of counsel to be

frivolous. (R., p.46.) However, in determining whether to appoint counsel, the court is
required to look at the petition to see if it presents the possibility of a valid claim - not
the motion for appointment of counsel.
Second, in the order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief, the district
court concluded that, "Idaho courts have clearly determined that pro se litigants 'are not
accorded special latitude .... "' (R., p.69) (quoting Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,
220 (2009.)

Thus, the court concluded that Mr. O'Neil was, "still held to the same

standards and rules that every attorney in this jurisdiction is required to follow."
(R., p.70.)
At this stage of the proceeding, the district court was clearly incorrect. The Idaho

Supreme Court has warned district courts to "keep in mind the admonition set forth in

Brown about the typical problems with prose pleadings." Charboneau I, 140 Idaho at
793. Specifically, '"the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed
by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete."' Id. at 792 (quoting

Brown, 135 Idaho at 679). To that point, '"facts sufficient to state a claim ... may not be
alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the essential
elements of a claim."'

Id.

As such, where the pro se petitioner alleges some facts

tending to support his claim, counsel should be appointed in his case. Charboneau I,
140 Idaho at 793; Brown, 135 Idaho at 679. Therefore, when moving for appointment of
counsel, Mr. O'Neil should not have beenheld to the same standards as an attorney.
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Finally, the court incorrectly determined that Mr. O'Neil's claims were frivolous.
Mr. O'Neil alleged that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to an amount of
restitution without his consent and for failing to file a motion to suppress. These are the
types of claims where an attorney could investigate and perhaps present a meritorious
claim. Mr. O'Neil alleged that the restitution he owed was for crimes he did not commit
and that the victim's property was returned on the crime for which he was convicted. He
also alleged that the search of the vehicle was done prior to getting the owner's
consent.

These are possibly valid claims and the district court erred by denying

appointment of counsel to investigate and refine them.

2.

Summary Dismissal

Because he submitted evidence in support of his claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, Mr. O'Neil asserts that the district court erred when it determined that he had
submitted only conclusory allegations, not evidence, in support of his claims.

It

therefore erred in summarily dismissing his petition.
Summary disposition of a post-conviction petition on the pleadings and record is
not proper if a material issue of fact exists. I.C. § 19-4906(c). When genuine issues of
material fact exist that would entitle the applicant to relief, if resolved in the applicant's
favor, summary disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.

Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008).
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court
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determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file, and it liberally construes the facts
and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau v. State, 144
Idaho 900, 903 (2007) (hereinafter, Charboneau //). The lower court's legal conclusions
are reviewed de novo. Owen v. State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997).
When summary dismissal is an issue and the facts are disputed, a court is
required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true. Charboneau II,
144 Idaho at 903.

It does not, however, have to accept the petitioner's conclusions

as to the impact of those facts on his claims.

See id. Where the petitioner's factual

allegations are rebutted and the case is still dismissed without an evidentiary hearing,
"this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe
the

facts

Workman

and

v.

reasonable

inferences

in

favor

of

the

non-moving

party."

State, 144 Idaho 518, 523 (2007).

The only situations in which allegations contained in the application will be
insufficient for relief is where they are either clearly disproved by the record or do not
justify relief as a matter of law. Id. Where pleadings are verified, they are treated as
affidavits and are admissible evidence in post-conviction proceedings.

See Mata v.

State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993); I.C. § 19-4907(a). As such, Mr. O'Neil's

verified pleadings constitute facts for this Court to consider.
In his petition, Mr. O'Neil made two allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel: 1) that counsel entered into a stipulation for restitution without his knowledge
and consent; and 2) that counsel failed to file a motion to suppress. (R., p.5.) "The test
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for determining whether a defendant has received effective assistance of counsel is the
two-part test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)]."

(2004).

McKeeth

v. State. 140 Idaho 847, 850

"The first prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show that

counsel's performance was deficient.

The second prong requires the defendant to

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."

Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, a post-conviction petition must establish that: (1) a material issue of
fact exists as to whether his trial counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material
issue of fact exists as to whether that deficiency prejudiced his case.

See Gilpin-

Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81 (2002). "To establish a deficiency, the applicant has

the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, "the
applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Mr. O'Neil submits that the district court erred by determining that he alleged only
bare and conclusory allegations unsupported by any evidence.

As set forth above,

Mr. O'Neil's verified petition is evidence. With regard to restitution, Mr. O'Neil alleged
that his trial attorney had initially informed him that any restitution would be illegal
because everything found in Mr. O'Neil's possession was returned. (R., p.9.) However,
according to Mr. O'Neil, the prosecutor sought restitution for a burglary for which
Mr. O'Neil was never charged. (R., p.9.) Further, Mr. O'Neil asserted that the transcript
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of the sentencing hearing revealed that there was a dispute over restitution that would
be resolved at a subsequent hearing. (R., p.9.) The transcript confirms this. (R., p.31.)
Mr. O'Neil then alleged that the hearing was held in his absence and that counsel
stipulated to restitution even though restitution should never have been ordered.
(R., pp.9-10.)

Thus, Mr. O'Neil alleged both deficient performance (stipulating to

restitution without his consent) and prejudice (a restitution award, where Mr. O'Neil
believed restitution to be unlawful.) And considering that these allegations were made
in an affidavit attached to a verified petition, they are evidence, not conclusory
allegations. The district court therefore erred by dismissing this claim.

CONCLUSION
Mr. O'Neil respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review. If
granted, he requests that this Court vacate the district court's ordering summarily
dismissing the petition and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 22 nd day of January, 2014.

ublic Defender
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